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A SAFE CULTURE FOR NEUROSCIENCE

BRUCE WALLER*
ABSTRACT
When examining the future impact of neuroscience on the law, the
first step requires narrowing the scope of the inquiry: advances in
neuroscience are exciting, but the beneficial or harmful effects of
those advances will depend on the specific culture in which they
occur. In some cultures—such as in Norway or Sweden—integrating
advances in neuroscience into the criminal justice system is likely to
enhance understanding and improve the treatment of offenders and
potential offenders. In the neoliberal culture of the United States,
advances are more likely to exacerbate the profound wrongs of the
criminal justice system rather than ameliorate them. The important
question for neoliberal cultures is whether advances in neuroscience
might contribute to the reform of those cultures. While neuroscience
can contribute to that goal, there is a danger that neuroscience
advances might encourage the radical individualist orientation of
neoliberalism and revive a “nothing works” attitude toward rehabilitation. The benefits of neuroscience are more likely to emerge when
the worst elements of neoliberal culture have been reformed.

* Professor Emeritus, Youngstown State University (Retired).
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INTRODUCTION
Neuroscience research is fascinating, promising, and often enlightening. We are privileged to observe the research in its precocious infancy, look forward to its adolescent achievements, and
dream of its amazing maturity. We are only beginning to consider
how neuroscientific research might change our world. Descartes
made the mind a radically different substance from the material
body to protect our godlike minds from becoming objects of scientific
determinism.1 Not many years ago, the Nobel laureate of neuroscientific research, John Eccles, insisted on preserving the radical
dualistic distinction between brain and mind in order to keep our
cognitive processes free of physical forces.2 Powerful vestiges of
mind/body dualism flourish in popular belief 3 and subtly influence
scientists,4 philosophers,5 and legal thought6 (including intellectual
property,7 tort,8 property,9 and criminal10 law). Neuroscientific
research seems poised to demolish the last barrier between mind
1. See John Cottingham, Translator’s Preface to RENÉ DESCARTES, Meditations on First
Philosophy, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 1 (John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch trans., 1984).
2. See JOHN C. ECCLES, EVOLUTION OF THE BRAIN: CREATION OF THE SELF 178 (1989).
3. PETER A. ALCES, THE MORAL CONFLICT OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 18-19 (2018)
(noting that the dualism of folk psychology holds “that there is something other than the brain
that acts, that a mind or the ‘human being’ or ‘the person’ is positioned to exert control over
what the brain dictates”).
4. See Athena Demertzi et al., Dualism Persists in the Science of Mind, 1157 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCIS. 1, 8 (2009) (revealing the prevalence of dualistic attitudes that emphasize separateness of mind and body).
5. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN LIST, WHY FREE WILL IS REAL 5-9 (2019) (basing claim for the
reality of free will on a strong distinction between the physical and the psychological).
6. See, e.g., Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. 975, 980-81 (2015)
(examining mind-body dualism and “its entrenchment in the doctrines of harm, compulsion,
and intentionality”).
7. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 185-91 (2007) (noting dualist assumptions in copyright and
patent law).
8. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 191 (1992) (criticizing dualism in torts).
9. See, e.g., Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal
Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1338-40, 1347-49 (1996) (analyzing dualism in property law).
10. See, e.g., Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036,
2047-55 (2013) (identifying dualism in determinations of criminal harm).
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and brain,11 and it is hardly surprising that this research holds
amazing promise for some while terrifying others.
Neuroscientists have made remarkable discoveries about the
operations of our brains, but there is still very limited understanding of how the brain interacts with the larger nervous system, how
various activities of the brain work together, why the general results have noteworthy individual exceptions, and how the nervous
system operates in various environments and under differing stimuli.12 Still, with such an exciting area of research—a research program that even in its infancy has challenged many of our basic ideas
and beliefs—it is worthwhile to explore the potential impact of
neuroscience research on our lives and our institutions. Of those
institutions, none are more important than our legal and criminal
justice systems.
There are two distinctly different approaches to considering the
influence of neuroscience on our justice system. One approach locks
the basic assumptions and principles of our legal system in place
and explores ways that neuroscience might influence and improve
the operations of that given system.13 The other approach examines
the possibility of neuroscientific research replacing our current
criminal justice system with something radically different.14
When examining the implications of neuroscience for change
within a system, it is essential to specify the nature of the given
cultural system. Some may claim that scientists should focus on
the advancement of science, not on how its innovations will be used.
But that is disingenuous: we know that when North Korea obtains
facial recognition software, it will not be used to make iPhones
more convenient. In like manner, neuroscience advances and
11. A. DAVID REDISH, THE MIND WITHIN THE BRAIN: HOW WE MAKE DECISIONS AND HOW
THOSE DECISIONS GO WRONG 159 (2013) (“[T]he theory that mind and brain are separable is
untenable, and the available data suggest instead that they are the same thing.”).
12. See 2 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, GRAY MATTERS:
TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 86-89 (2015).
13. See Joshua W. Buckholtz & David L. Faigman, Promises, Promises for Neuroscience
and Law, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY R861, R866 (2014).
14. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing
and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1775, 1775 (2004); Gregg D. Caruso
& Derk Pereboom, A Non-Punitive Alternative to Retributive Punishment, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND PUNISHMENT 355-63 (Farah Focquaert et al.
eds., 2021).
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neurointervention are not good or bad absolutely, but relative to the
culture. Such advances might be quite beneficial in Norway but
profoundly harmful in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The focus here will be on U.S. culture and the benefits or detriments of neuroscience in that culture. U.S. culture is profoundly
influential, and among Western cultures the United States marks
one extreme.15 The U.S. implications for neuroscience are very different from the cultural implications in places like Sweden, Norway,
or Belgium.16 What are the implications of applying neuroscientific
advances within the existing U.S. judicial system? One of the most
debated questions concerns using neuroscientific brain analyses to
predict violent antisocial behavior.17 There may be advantages to
the use of such processes: if we could predict at a relatively early
age who is likely to become a violent criminal, then we could kindly
intervene in such a way as to prevent criminal violence.18 That
would not only reduce criminal violence against innocent victims,
but also would rescue potential criminals from lives of violent crime,
imprisonment, and misery.19 Those are worthwhile aspirations, and
most who champion such aspirations are sincerely devoted to reducing violence and improving lives. In some cultures, such programs might be genuinely beneficial—not in the United States.

15. See Farah Focquaert et al., Introduction to THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND PUNISHMENT 1 (Farah Focquaert et al. eds., 2021).
16. See id.
17. Russell A. Poldrack et al., Predicting Violent Behavior: What Can Neuroscience Add?,
22 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 111, 111 (2018) (“The ability to accurately predict violence and
other forms of serious antisocial behavior would provide important societal benefits, and there
is substantial enthusiasm for the potential predictive accuracy of neuroimaging techniques.”).
18. Jennifer Brooks-Crozier, Note, The Nature and Nurture of Violence: Early Intervention
Services for the Families of MAOA-Low Children as a Means to Reduce Violent Crime and the
Costs of Violent Crime, 44 CONN. L. REV. 531, 537 (2011).
19. See Thomas Nadelhoffer et al., Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the
Stage, 5 NEUROETHICS 67, 68 (2012).
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I. EXISTING BARRIERS TO NEUROSCIENTIFIC ADVANCEMENT
A. Preventive Incarceration
Suppose that neuroscientists could predict, with impressive accuracy, who is likely to commit violent criminal acts. Neuroscientists
cannot currently make such predictions, and such predictive success
is unlikely in the near future.20 But neuroscience is advancing rapidly, and it is a prospect that some have embraced. We might discover problems early, find ways of correcting or ameliorating them,
improve the lives of potential violent criminals, and avoid the
suffering of their victims. And we would carefully regulate such
testing and intervention to prevent abuse. However, in the United
States, we would never allow imprisoning people based on a prediction of wrongful behavior; such measures can only be taken in
response to proven criminal acts, any punitive measures must be
proportionate to the wrong that has actually been committed, and
any preventive interventions require the free and informed consent
of the subject.
That is a charming American myth, but equal in plausibility to
the claim that the United States is a land of “liberty and justice for
all.” The sad, but obvious fact is that the United States already
practices mass imprisonment based on the possibility of future
criminal behavior. For instance, the draconian laws against sex
offenders explicitly provide for continuing punitive “preventive”
imprisonment after completion of the criminal sentence.21 This
continued “preventive” imprisonment may be called “regulatory”
rather than punitive, but the prisoner often remains in the same
prison cell under the same conditions.22 There are currently
20. See Olivia Choy, Biosocial Risk Factors for Offending, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 14, at 215, 216-17; Corey H.
Allen & Eyal Aharoni, Current Trends in Cognitive Neuroscience and Criminal Punishment,
in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note
14, at 250-51.
21. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive Detention, 101
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 970-71 (2011).
22. See BRUCE N. WALLER, THE INJUSTICE OF PUNISHMENT 155 (2018); see also Vincent
Chiao, Punishment and Permissibility in the Criminal Law, 32 LAW & PHIL. 729, 730-31
(2013).
OF THE
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thousands of people who have been charged but not convicted of any
crime who are incarcerated because they lack the funds to post a
cash bail; or they are held without bail—out of fear that they might
commit a future antisocial act, such as failing to appear for a scheduled court date.23 The poor are held in jail, while the affluent post
bail and proceed with their comfortable lives.24 On a typical day in
2014, there were more than ten thousand people in New Jersey jails
who had not been found guilty of anything.25 They were awaiting
trial, and their average wait was ten months.26 Forty percent had
the option of posting bail but lacked the funds.27
As egregious as this practice is, it is not the largest or most obvious form of “preventive imprisonment.” A few years ago—in a law
and order frenzy—the United States adopted a policy that continues
to this day: mass “incapacitation”28 of those deemed likely to commit
future crimes.29 A young person shoplifts some expensive sunglasses
(first offense), resists arrest (second offense), and when searched is
found to possess a small amount of cocaine (third offense)—three
strikes, and life imprisonment looms.30 No one pretends that life
23. See Justine Olderman, Pre-Trial Detention and the Supplanting of Our Adversarial
System: A Case for Abolition, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 14, at 344.
24. See id.
25. See New Jersey State Commission of Investigation Releases Damning Report on Commercial Bail Industry Practices, DRUG POL’Y ALL. (May 20, 2014), https://drugpolicy.org/news/
2014/05/new-jersey-state-commission-investigation-releases-damning-report-commercial-bailindus [https://perma.cc/PD4D-LVLX].
26. See id.
27. Id. (“Nearly 75 percent of the 15,000 individuals in New Jersey jails are there pretrial,
meaning they have not yet been convicted of a crime or found guilty by a jury. Nearly forty
percent of the total population is there solely because they cannot afford to pay bail and 12
percent have a bail amount of $2,500 or less. The average length of incarceration for pretrial
inmates is more than ten months.”).
28. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145-46 (2d rev. ed. 1983) (“Incapacitation,
on the other hand, works by definition: its effects result from the physical restraint placed
upon the offender and not from his subjective state.”).
29. See Andrew von Hirsch, Incapacitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON
THEORY AND POLICY 79-80 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (noting selective
incapacitation was endorsed by James Wilson and others); Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism,
Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L.J. 536, 536-43 (2006).
30. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 89-106 (2001); Elsa Chen, Three-Strikes Legislation, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 551-54 (Delores D. Jones-Brown et al. eds.,
2014).
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imprisonment is a “proportionate” or “just” sentence for three minor
felonies, but the goal of the program was not—and is not—justice for
past offenses; rather, it is an excuse to “incapacitate repeat offenders” with long prison sentences on the assumption that repeat offenders are likely to commit future offenses.31 The incapacitation
policy has imprisoned tens of thousands on the basis of a crude
prediction of future offenses; this is a policy that imprisons many
people who would have never committed a future criminal act but
instead would have matured, lived a crime-free life, and settled into
a job, as well as relationship and family obligations.32 But neither
the accuracy of the predictions nor the justice of the process was at
issue. “Selective incapacitation” is half right: it certainly incapacitated many people, families, and communities, but it was far from
selective.33 A culture that embraces “preventive incarceration” on
flimsy predictive grounds would be unlikely to resist the siren song
of “preventive detention” based on impressive neuroscientific
screening techniques.
Currently employed methods of “selective incapacitation” are not
very careful in their selection processes, especially when those
selected are economically deprived persons of color.34 Still, such
“selective incapacitation” measures do require an initial felony
conviction.35 Neuroscience-based “preventive” measures would not
meet that standard. It might be supposed that requiring a felony
conviction would provide a safeguard against such measures—a
vain hope. Requiring a felony conviction provides little protection
because protection against unjust felony convictions is anemic at
best; not only are the innocent routinely convicted of crimes they did
not commit,36 but that fact is well-known in the American culture
31. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (approving incapacitation for the
purpose of crime prevention, requiring no empirical evidence of its effectiveness for that
purpose).
32. See Leipold, supra note 29, at 543-44, 547-48.
33. See id. at 536-38.
34. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment,
27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015).
35. See Leipold, supra note 29, at 541-42.
36. Samuel R. Gross et al., Government Misconduct and Convicting the Innocent, NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS iii (2020), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Docu
ments/Government_Misconduct_and_Convicting_the_Innocent.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA2GKVXW] (“Official misconduct contributed to the false convictions of 54% of defendants who

2022]

A SAFE CULTURE FOR NEUROSCIENCE

1453

and seemingly causes little concern.37 To the contrary, measures
that might reduce the number of false convictions are actively
opposed as being “soft on crime.”38 And the enormous profits made
by those supplying the massive prison system—and especially by
the notorious “private prison” industry—provide a powerful incentive to pack the prisons, whether the “clients” are guilty or
innocent.39
B. Faulty Investigative Practices
Further, forensic science in the United States is deeply flawed.
False forensic evidence has been found in city crime labs in Chicago,
Cleveland, Detroit, Houston, Oklahoma City, Omaha, San Francisco, and Washington; state crime labs in California, Illinois,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia;
the FBI crime lab; and the crime lab of the U.S. Army.40 These are
only the most horrific cases that could not be covered up—likely
only the tip of a massive fraudulent forensic iceberg. This is hardly
surprising. Forensic labs are part of the police force, and those
working in the labs often see their role as supporting the efforts of
the police and the prosecutors to obtain a conviction.41 An obvious
improvement, often recommended, is that the labs be made independent of the police.42 That recommendation is consistently
were later exonerated. In general, the rate of misconduct is higher in more severe crimes.”).
37. See Robert J. Norris & Kevin J. Mullinix, Framing Innocence: An Experimental Test
of the Effects of Wrongful Convictions on Public Opinion, 16 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY
311, 312 (2020).
38. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes Laws: A Real or Imagined Deterrent to Crime?, 29
HUM. RTS. 3, 5 (2002).
39. Laura I. Appleman, Cashing in on Convicts: Privatization, Punishment, and the People, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 579, 583 (“Total revenues for private corrections are over $3.3 billion
per year, and private prison executives at the leading companies rake in enormous compensation packages, in some cases totaling millions of dollars. Profits are ripe for the taking when
it comes to privatizing punishment.” (footnotes omitted)).
40. Radley Balko, Private Crime Labs Could Prevent Errors, Analyst Bias: Report,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2011, 5:49 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-case-for-pri
vate-crime-labs_n_876963 [https://perma.cc/W5QF-Q525].
41. See id.
42. Radley Balko, How Do We Improve Forensics?, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/26/how-do-we-improve-forensics/ [https://perma.
cc/D8XM-HGRZ] (quoting Barbara A. Spellman, University of Virginia School of Law: “Get
the forensics lab out from under the control of the police/prosecutor’s office. And move it
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rejected; the police and district attorneys prefer forensic experts who
are “on their side” rather than independent, and challenging those
who “fight crime” is not politically expedient in a powerfully retributive culture.43
In addition to biased and outright fraudulent “evidence,” U.S.
crime labs often employ investigative techniques with no scientific
validity.44 For years legislation has been proposed to correct the
problems, but no bill has ever come close to passing.45 Even when
the forensic errors and wrongful convictions are discovered, often
little or no effort is made to free those who are wrongly incarcerated.
The Washington Post reported that in the District of Columbia,
“Justice Department officials had known for years that flawed
forensic testimony and false matches might have led to the convictions of hundreds of potentially innocent people,” but the Justice
Department did not pursue a thorough investigation, and “[i]n many
cases that the agency did review and found problems with, prosecutors never notified defendants or their attorneys of the issues uncovered.”46
The problem of flawed forensic “evidence” is exacerbated by the
fact that prosecutors often knowingly present such evidence in their
efforts to “win” a conviction at any cost. As Bennett Gershman
points out, “[d]ocumented cases of open and notorious misconduct by
forensic laboratories and of rogue experts giving fraudulent testimony strongly suggest that many prosecutors are fully aware that
the laboratory and the expert have been engaging in a long-standing
practice and pattern of misconduct.”47 Not only is flawed forensic
“evidence” presented as legitimate, but prosecutors sometimes withhold evidence (in violation of discovery and disclosure rights) that
physically away.”).
43. See id.
44. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD xix-xx, 4 (2009).
45. See Eric Maloney, Note, Two More Problems and Too Little Money: Can Congress
Truly Reform Forensic Science?, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 923, 924 (2013).
46. Spenser S. Hsu, Santae Tribble Cleared in 1978 Murder Based on DNA Hair Test,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-judge-exoneratessantae-tribble-of-1978-murder-based-on-dna-hair-test/2012/12/14/da71ce00-d02c-11e1-b630190a983a2e0d_story.html [https://perma.cc/XG96-HLJG].
47. Bennett J. Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 17, 26-27 (2003).
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would support the innocence of the accused.48 Gershman notes a
1999 study reporting that “convictions in 381 homicide cases nationwide [have been] reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence of defendants’ innocence or knowingly presented false
evidence.”49 In the current U.S. culture, adding another forensic
device—such as neurologically based evidence concerning “truthtelling”—will likely yield greater harm than benefit.50
C. Jailhouse Informants
While the United States is almost unique in its system of cash
bail, and brazen concerning its reliance on flawed forensic testimony, there is a still more obvious and egregious marker of the
American contempt for preventing unjust convictions: the widespread use of jailhouse informants.51 A jailhouse informant who is
in jail awaiting trial or sentencing, or is currently serving a criminal
sentence, makes contact with the district attorney’s office and offers
to testify; the jailed suspect in another case confessed or bragged
that he committed the crime with which he is charged, and if the
prosecutor can do something for the informant—drop or reduce the
charges, ask the judge for sentencing leniency, or facilitate early
release or transfer to a halfway house—then the informant will bolster the prosecutor’s case with polished, damning testimony.52 One
practiced jailhouse informant heard so many “confessions” that he
was nicknamed “The Monsignor.”53 Experiences with jailhouse
informants in Canada and the United States mark a stark cultural
contrast.
48. See id. at 40 & n.145.
49. Id.
50. See Adrianna C. Jenkins et al., Cognitive Neuroscience of Honesty and Deception: A
Signaling Framework, 11 CURRENT OP. BEHAV. SCIS. 130, 131 (2016).
51. See Informing Injustice: The Disturbing Use of Jailhouse Informants, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2019), https://innocenceproject.org/informing-injustice/ [https://perma.cc/
QSM2-D8Q4] (“Jailhouse informant testimony is one of the leading contributing factors of
wrongful convictions nationally, playing a role in nearly one in five of the 367 DNA-based exoneration cases.”).
52. See id.
53. Will Bunch, Walter Ogrod’s 22-Year Fight to Escape Death Row Gains Hope from
Krasner, Documentary, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/
columnists/will_bunch/walter-ogrod-death-row-stories-hln-larry-krasner-dna-testingphiladelphia-20180405.html [https://perma.cc/3H59-QNUQ].
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In Canada, Thomas Sophonow spent several years in prison following his wrongful conviction.54 When later evidence proved his
innocence, public and political outrage prompted a major inquiry
into this miscarriage of justice.55 The inquiry revealed that an important part of Sophonow’s trial was the perjured testimony of two
jailhouse informants,56 and ultimately the inquiry resulted in a
Canadian virtual ban on jailhouse informants.57 In the United
States, there have been dozens of cases—several involving death
row inmates and many others involving innocent people who spent
years in prison—in which DNA evidence has established the innocence of persons wrongfully convicted, and many of those cases
included perjured testimony of a jailhouse informant—perjured
testimony purchased with prosecutorial benefits, such as reduced
sentences and dropped charges.58 But as perjured jailhouse informant testimony continues unchecked, innocent people are convicted
by those lies, and—although there have been many media reports
of innocent persons imprisoned for years and even decades—there
is little public outcry against jailhouse informants and the prosecutors who purchase their lies with “get-out-of-jail-free” promises.59
The nature and frequency of this use of perjured testimony is well
known. As Brandon L. Garrett notes, “[i]nformants who are already
54. Richard J. Wolson & Aaron M. London, The Structure, Operation, and Impact of
Wrongful Conviction Inquiries: The Sophonow Inquiry as an Example of the Canadian Experience, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 677, 681-83 (2004).
55. Id. at 683-84.
56. Id. at 682-83.
57. In Manitoba, the recommendation of The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow was:
“As a general rule, jailhouse informants should be prohibited from testifying.” MANITOBA
JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW (July 7, 2000), https://digitalcollection.
gov.mb.ca/awweb/pdfopener?smd=1&did=12713&md=1 [https://perma.cc/FM2M-U9ZE]. This
was also the policy adopted in the policy manuals and directives of the Attorney Generals of
Ontario and Manitoba. See MANITOBA DEP’T OF JUST. PROSECUTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE
GUIDELINE NO. 2:INF:1 (2001); ONTARIO CROWN PROSECUTION MANUAL, IN-CUSTODY INFORMER PROSECUTION DIRECTIVE (2017).
58. One example, out of many, is the case of Robert DuBoise, who was imprisoned for
thirty-seven years after being wrongfully convicted of murder (he was initially sentenced to
death), largely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant who claimed that DuBoise confessed
to the murder; DNA evidence finally proved his innocence. Michael Levenson, DNA Evidence
Exonerates Man in 1983 Rape and Killing, Prosecutors Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/us/robert-duboise-wrongful-conviction.html [https://
perma.cc/R9FX-2WVV].
59. See Informing Injustice, supra note 51.
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in jail and testify against cellmates have long been considered
notoriously unreliable sources.”60 Myrna Raeder poses the painful
question, “[i]s it really arguable that prosecutors do not know that
jailhouse informants who repeatedly claim they obtained confessions are likely to be fabricating?”61 And the Ninth Circuit’s Judge
Trott offers a clear description of the corrupt and widely known
practice:
[B]ecause of the perverse and mercurial nature of the devils with
whom the criminal justice system has chosen to deal, each
contract for testimony is fraught with the real peril that the
proffered testimony will not be truthful, but simply factually
contrived to “get” a target of sufficient interest to induce
concessions from the government. Defendants or suspects with
nothing to sell sometimes embark on a methodical journey to
manufacture evidence and to create something of value, setting
up and betraying friends, relatives, and cellmates alike.62

The deeply retributive American culture exhibits little concern for
the innocents who are sent to prison through distorted forensic
evidence and perjured jailhouse informant testimony.63 That is
disturbing, but sadly not surprising. This casual attitude toward
who gets convicted and punished—whether guilty or innocent—is
closely connected with the deep retributivism in American culture.64
Though there are retributivists who are genuinely concerned about
punitive processes being just—Leo Zaibert is a noteworthy example65—the powerful retributive emotions are basically a desire to
strike back when we feel harmed. In the United States, these
emotions are celebrated in television crime dramas and exalted by
philosophers, such as Robert Solomon: “to seek vengeance for a
60. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG 124 (2011).
61. Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of
Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1413, 1438 (2007).
62. N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
63. See James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85
(2003) (“These thirty years of harsh justice have made for an epochal shift in American law,
opening a large divide between the United States and other countries of the western world.”).
64. See id.
65. See generally LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT (2018).
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grievous wrong, to revenge oneself against evil—that seems to lie at
the very foundation of our sense of justice, indeed, of our very sense
of ourselves, our dignity, and our sense of right and wrong.”66 And
that powerful desire for strike-back vengeance often overwhelms
any concerns about targeting the actual offender.67
D. Retributivism
Suffering harm triggers a strong desire to strike back. It is basically a desire to strike back against someone—the wrongdoer if
handy, but a scapegoat will do. “From the perspective of a theoretical distinction between provoker and target, redirected aggression
is not a special case; in most cases aggression just happens to be
directed at the object that provoked it,” because that object is easily
available.68 “Displaced” or “redirected” aggression is not an anomalous substitute for retributive strike-back desire but is instead the
fundamental motive.69 As David Barash and Judith Lipton note,
when the powerful alpha male harms me, then by attacking someone else I serve notice that I am still someone to fear: “Natural
selection would therefore reward victims who conspicuously ‘take it
out’ on someone else.”70 Barash and Lipton describe the phenomenon:
Animals—and by all accounts, people, too—who lose a social
confrontation experience what is called “subordination stress.”
Their blood pressure and adrenal hormones go up, while neurotransmitters that influence the sense of well-being go down. But
if these same animals have the opportunity to “take it out” on
another individual, their stress hormones and neurotransmitters
return to normal levels. In short, living things can reduce their
own pain-induced distress by passing that pain to another.
Think ... of the pattern: “A hurts B, B hurts C.” By displacing his
66. ROBERT C. SOLOMON, IN DEFENSE OF SENTIMENTALITY 37 (2004).
67. See Michael Potegal, Aggressive Arousal: The Amygdala Connection, in THE DYNAMICS
OF AGGRESSION: BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL PROCESSES IN DYADS AND GROUPS 88-89 (Michael
Potegal & John F. Knutson eds., 1994).
68. Id. at 88.
69. See DAVID P. BARASH & JUDITH EVE LIPTON, PAYBACK: WHY WE RETALIATE, REDIRECT
AGGRESSION, AND TAKE REVENGE 18 (2011).
70. Id.
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aggression, B down-regulates his stress and upgrades his neurotransmitters by dumping his pain on someone else, who is
then inclined to offload his or her burden, giving rise to “C hurts
D,” and so on.71

Our retributive emotions are rooted in a strike-back response that
attacks whatever is near. Rats that are shocked and then vent their
rage against another rat (or a gnawing post) suffer fewer problems,
such as stomach ulcers, than do rats shocked in circumstances in
which there is nothing to attack.72 In monkey colonies, a subordinate who suffers an attack from a higher ranking monkey typically
seeks out an individual lower in the hierarchy for attack.73 A sad
cartoon may show a boss berating a subordinate man, the man coming home to yell at his wife, the wife reprimanding the child, the
child then kicking the unoffending dog; no explanation is required
for the disturbing “humor.” Unscrupulous prosecutors have long realized that grisly photos of the crime scene and the murder victim,
and graphic descriptions of the brutal murder, can easily substitute
for real evidence against the defendant;74 outraged jurors desire to
strike back at somebody, and the defendant is a convenient target
for their wrath.
Analyze This is a comedy about a mob boss being treated by a
clinical psychologist.75 My favorite part is when the mob boss becomes furious following a phone call with a rival mobster, and the
psychologist offers counsel on anger management: “You know what
I do when I’m mad, Paul? I hit a pillow. Just hit the pillow, see how
you feel.”76 After the mobster pulls out a pistol and blows the pillow
apart, the psychologist regains sufficient composure to ask, “Feel
better?” The mobster replies, “Yeah, I do.”77 He does feel better.
71. Id. at 17.
72. Charles E. Virgin, Jr. & Robert M. Sapolsky, Styles of Male Social Behavior and Their
Endocrine Correlates Among Low-Ranking Baboons, 42 AM. J. PRIMATOLOGY 25, 36 (1999).
73. Syunzo Kawamura, Aggression as Studied in Troops of Japanese Monkeys, 7 UCLA
F. MED. SCIS. 195, 202-03, 216 (1967).
74. See Kevin S. Douglas et al., The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock
Jurors’ Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 485,
485-501 (1997); Rebecca H. Grady et al., Impact of Gruesome Photographic Evidence on Legal
Decisions: A Meta-Analysis, 25 PSYCHIATRY PSYCH. & L. 503, 503-18 (2018).
75. ANALYZE THIS (Warner Brothers 1999).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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When someone (mob boss or philosopher, chimpanzee or rat) is
attacked, threatened, or harmed, then by attacking someone else
the pain is “passed along” to the next victim.
Redirected aggression in Analyze This is amusing; in the case of
“the Central Park Five,” it is not. In 1989, a young woman jogging
in Central Park was assaulted, raped, and left for dead.78 Public
anger demanded a target, and five Black and Hispanic youths
ranging from fourteen to sixteen years old were quickly arrested.79
New York Daily News sensationalism fueled the anger with enormous headlines of “Wolfpack’s Prey: Female Jogger Near Death After
Attack by Roving Gang.”80 Donald Trump paid eighty-five thousand
dollars to publish a full page advertisement—headlined “BRING
BACK THE DEATH PENALTY. BRING BACK OUR POLICE!”—on
May 1, 1989, in The New York Times, The Daily News, The New
York Post, and New York Newsday.81 Trump’s advertisement demanded the death penalty for the “crazed misfits” whose “CIVIL
LIBERTIES END WHEN AN ATTACK ON OUR SAFETY BEGINS.”82 The guilt or innocence of the strike-back targets was
irrelevant. Strangely worded and inconsistent “confessions” were
coerced from the isolated frightened youths, and all were imprisoned
for years in either juvenile or adult facilities.83 Thirteen years later,
a man convicted of multiple rapes confessed that, acting alone, he
had beaten and raped the victim.84 DNA evidence confirmed his
confession.85 The Central Park Five were absolved, and outrage was
expressed, but nothing was done to prevent similar injustices.86

78. See N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the
Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2004).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 1349 n.306.
81. Rebecca Morin, ‘They Admitted Their Guilt’: 30 Years of Trump’s Comments About the
Central Park Five, USA TODAY (June 20, 2019, 6:14 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/2019/06/19/what-trump-has-said-central-park-five/1501321001/ [https://perma.
cc/MX9V-9288].
82. Amy Davidson Sorkin, Donald Trump and the Central Park Five, NEW YORKER (June
23, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/donald-trump-and-the-centralpark-five [https://perma.cc/7X2E-EFCS].
83. See Duru, supra note 78, at 1316-18.
84. Id. at 1315-16.
85. Id. at 1317.
86. See id. at 1364-65.
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The powerful desire to strike back is at the heart of retributivism.87 This desire is not targeted at the wrongdoer, but at the
most convenient target.88 It is hardly surprising, then, that profoundly retributive cultures are careless concerning who gets punished and the punitive measures are much harsher (even including
capital punishment).89 In some cultures, the strike-back motive—
though certainly felt—is better controlled and is recognized as a
poor guide to behavior; in retributive cultures such as the United
States, striking back is celebrated as a fundamental element of
moral life.90 Cultures that celebrate retributive strike-back policies—complete with politicians who pander to populist punitiveness
(penal populism)—are not cultures that can be trusted with potentially dangerous neuroscientific advances that can be exploited
for abuse and control.91 In a culture that does not care about convicting the right person when it is a question of who was guilty of
past criminal behavior, we cannot expect any greater concern about
who is “preemptively imprisoned” or “preemptively treated” on the
prediction of future criminal behavior.
E. The Penal System
The danger of “preemptive” forced “treatment” (or isolation/incarceration) of those identified as “high risk” may be very low in
Sweden or the Netherlands, but it is much higher in the United
87. At a deeper level, the nonconscious “belief in a just world” plays a role in transforming
the “pass the pain along desire” into morally justified just deserts and “righteous retribution.”
See Adrian Furnham, Belief in a Just World: Research Progress over the Past Decade, 34
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 795, 795 (2003) (“The [basic belief in a just world]
asserts that, quite justly, good things tend to happen to good people and bad things to bad
people despite the fact this is patently not the case.”). To make strike-back harm fit the basic
belief in a just world, it is essential that those harmed must justly deserve their suffering. The
process is described in greater detail in BRUCE N. WALLER, THE STUBBORN SYSTEM OF MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 53-78 (2015).
88. See WALLER, supra note 87, at 59.
89. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1318 (2000).
90. See id. at 1313-14, 1317, 1325, 1358.
91. Populist punitiveness has been particularly strong in the United States. NICOLA
LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACIES 3-54 (2008); see also Carolyn Côté-Lussier & Jason T. Carmichael, Public Support for Harsh Criminal Justice Policy and Its Moral and Ideological Tides, 24 PSYCH. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 235, 235-36 (2018).
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States.92 Consider programs that offer reduced sentences or probationary release for those who are willing to accept such treatments. Farah Focquaert and her colleagues proposed five essential
conditions for the ethical legitimacy of neurointerventions offered
“as a condition of probation, parole, or sentence reduction,” as
follows:
(a) the status quo is in no way cruel, inhuman, degrading or in
some other way wrong; (b) the neurointervention itself is in no
way cruel, inhuman, degrading, or in some other way wrong;
(c) the neurointervention respects the well-being of the offender;
(d) the neurointervention targets one or more risk factors for
recidivism; and (e) the neurotintervention is voluntary: the
offender is formally required to give his or her free and informed
consent upon acceptance.93

There might exist some U.S. prisons that could meet the first standard, prisons that are not “cruel, inhuman, or degrading,” but if so,
they are probably the country club prisons reserved for inside traders and corrupt politicians, and it is difficult to imagine any neurointerventions that would effectively target their greed, arrogance,
and mendacity. It is even more difficult to imagine guilty stockbrokers consenting to have their greedy characters improved. U.S.
prisons holding violent offenders—the prisoners who might be the
best candidates for neurointervention—are brutally cruel and degrading.94 The European Court of Human Rights condemned
solitary confinement as a form of torture and a basic violation of human rights.95 Amnesty International reached the same conclusion
92. See LACEY, supra note 91, at 3-54.
93. Farah Focquaert et al., Offering Neurointerventions to Offenders with CognitiveEmotional Impairments, in NEUROINTERVENTIONS AND THE LAW: REGULATING HUMAN MENTAL
CAPACITY 127, 128-29 (Nicole A. Vincent et al. eds., 2020).
94. See, e.g., Cruel Isolation: Amnesty International’s Concerns About Conditions in Arizona Maximum Security Prisons, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Cruel Isolation],
https://www.amnestyusa.org/ reports/cruel-isolation-amnesty-internationals-concerns-aboutconditions-in-arizona-maxi mum-security-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/VMR5-H4J7].
95. See EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., GUIDE ON THE CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 50 (2021), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Prisoners_rights_
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ3E-SZSR] (“[C]omplete sensory isolation, coupled with total social isolation, can destroy the personality and constitutes a form of inhuman treatment which
cannot be justified by the requirements of security or any other reason.”).
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concerning the notorious U.S. “Supermax” prisons,96 where many
prisoners live in extreme isolation for years on end, suffering psychological damage that is severe and often irreversible.97
Because the “status quo” is horrific, the fifth condition—voluntary
consent—also cannot be met. It is one thing to offer the “choice” of
prison or treatment if the alternative to treatment is Attica—quite
another if the alternative is Bastøy Island. Prison is inherently
coercive, and choices in such settings can never be entirely
noncoercive, but the latter choice is much less coercive than the
former. Neurointervention offers that might be legitimate in
Norway are not legitimate in the current culture of the United
States, where Supermax prisons routinely violate the prohibition of
torture and inflict permanent psychological damage on inmates.98
The contrast between the U.S. prison system—and its “just deserts”
and “shaming” motives—and the prison system of Norway can be
marked by the experience of the former superintendent of Attica
Correctional Facility in New York, James Conway, when he visited
Halden Prison, a maximum security prison in Norway. Conway was
shocked and dismayed when he observed that prisoners were
treated with respect and dignity and made as comfortable as
possible in a prison setting that looked more like a college campus.99
The fact that the recidivism rate from Halden was a fraction of
Attica’s rate did not impress him.100 A prison where inmates were

96. See Cruel Isolation, supra note 94.
97. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 325, 332-33, 354 (2006); Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological
Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know
and Recommending What Should Change, 52 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR.
CRIMINOLOGY 622, 623, 627, 631, 633 (2008); Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, Introduction
to HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE: VOICES FROM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 1, 10-12 (Jean Casella
et al. eds., 2016).
98. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
99. See Nathan Francis, A Look at Life Inside Norway’s Halden Prison, Where There Are
No Bars and Inmates Have Flat-Screen TVs Inside Their Cells, INQUISITR (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.inquisitr.com/1550875/a-look-at-life-inside-norways-halden-prison-where-thereare-no-bars-and-inmates-have-flat-screen-tvs-inside-their-cells/ [https://perma.cc/9KUMAXPX].
100. See id.; Simon McCormack, Former New York Prison Warden Visits Norwegian Prison,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ny-prison-warden-norwegi
an-prison_n_6063360 [https://perma.cc/2DTV-Z93H].
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treated well, rehabilitated, and lived in relative comfort violated
Conway’s deepest beliefs about what prison should be:
Prison is not supposed to be comfortable .... Prison is not a
comfortable situation. Society is supposed to be comfortable, the
inmate has given up his right to be in society by violating laws,
[by] violent crimes, by committing murder, by committing rape.
That person shouldn’t be coddled, shouldn’t be given a situation
where we’re concerned about how they should feel if someone
should walk by their cell and see them on the toilet. Who cares
how they feel.101

If offered a “choice” among a long prison sentence in Attica, years in
solitary confinement in a U.S. Supermax prison, or a lobotomy, the
lobotomy might be a wise choice, but it would hardly be an autonomous or dignity-enhancing choice.
There is another reason why we should be deeply suspicious of
any neurointervention programs that are offered to those incarcerated in the United States. If there is a genuine concern with
rehabilitation of prisoners, programs could be offered that pose none
of the risks associated with neurointervention.102 Yet those programs are not offered, or, at best, they are in short supply. Less
than 10 percent of U.S. prisoners suffering from drug or alcohol
addiction have access to treatment.103 Though medications for opioid
use disorder have been proven effective, only 5 percent of inmates
with opioid use disorder receive medication treatment.104 The United States not only leads the world in imprisonment, but also in its
recidivism rate: approximately two-thirds of those released from
prison are arrested within three years.105 For-profit prisons—an
enormously profitable growth industry in the United States—have

101. See Francis, supra note 99.
102. See Focquaert et al., supra note 93, at 144.
103. Redonna K. Chandler et al., Treating Drug Abuse and Addiction in the Criminal
Justice System: Improving Public Health and Safety, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 183, 185 (2009).
104. NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G & MED., MEDICATIONS FOR OPIOID USE DISORDER SAVE
LIVES 19-20 (2019).
105. Measuring Recidivism, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Feb. 20, 2008), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/
articles/measuring-recidivism [https://perma.cc/VQ8R-V7GZ].
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little motive for rehabilitating prisoners; doing so is expensive and
cuts into profits, and also lessens the likelihood of “repeat customers.”106 But these prisons have a powerful motive for any intervention that will make prisoners docile and easier to manage, thus
requiring fewer expensive security measures.107 If neurointervention is proposed at the Norwegian prison on Bastøy Island, it is
reasonable to suppose that the motive is finding better methods of
rehabilitating prisoners and enhancing their autonomy and their
opportunities. Until there is evidence of a genuine commitment to
rehabilitation, there is good reason to suspect that the real motive
behind any neurointervention program in the United States will be
control and pacification, rather than genuine rehabilitation of the
prisoner, much less any commitment to enhancing the autonomy of
the prisoner.
II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
Some cultures may be safe for the use of neuroscience in treating
criminals; the American culture is not. But the gross injustices of
the American system of criminal “justice” make the larger question
even more important: Can advances in neuroscience lead the way to
reform of a culture, helping to profoundly change the deep systemic
wrongs of that cultural system?
A. Cultural Complacency
Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen wrote an article provocatively entitled, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything.”108 They argued that the law, operating as an independent institution with its own basic principles, might largely ignore
advances in neuroscience and preserve its deep commitment to
individual moral responsibility, but that it is also possible that
106. See Julia Bowling, Do Private Prison Contracts Fuel Mass Incarceration?, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/
do-private-prison-contracts-fuel-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/7ZFJ-E5J6].
107. There is also the danger of using “therapeutic” justifications as a pretext for lengthening incarceration. Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 226, 229 (1959).
108. Greene & Cohen, supra note 14.
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advances in neuroscience would bring about fundamental changes
in basic beliefs—changes that would result in major changes to the
criminal justice system.109 Their “empirical prediction” was that “as
more and more scientific facts come in, providing increasingly vivid
illustrations of what the human mind is really like, more and more
people will develop moral intuitions that are at odds with our
current social practices.”110 I cherish their prediction and fervently
hope that advances in neuroscience will bring about a radical
change in beliefs about moral responsibility and retributivism and
lead to profound changes in the American criminal justice system.
But that fervent hope seems approximately as plausible as a hope
I cherished half a century ago: that the Age of Aquarius would
dawn, peace would guide the planets, and love would steer the stars.
Neuroscience is exciting, its discoveries are fascinating, and its
potential seems unlimited. But precisely those factors may lead us
to exaggerate the power of neuroscience to facilitate cultural change.
Even the most exciting and revolutionary scientific developments
often have failed to cause major changes in entrenched cultures and
institutions.111 The Copernican Revolution was an astounding
mathematical and astronomical breakthrough, with potential for
dramatically changing the way we see the world and our place in
that world.112 Except for a few thinkers, such as Bruno, Kepler, and
Galileo, that change did not occur.113 Cultural and institutional
forces—Aristotle’s authority, both Catholic and Protestant churches,
and basic “common sense”—held the fixed Earth securely in place.114
Some adjustments were made—the Church and the universities
adopted Tychonism, with the Sun orbiting the Earth and all the
other planets orbiting the Sun—but the Earth remained fixed and
motionless.115 As Bruno and Galileo learned to their sorrow,
109. See id. at 1775-78.
110. Id. at 1781.
111. See, e.g., Clifford Siskin, Enlightenment, Information, and the Copernican Delay: A
Venture into the History of Knowledge, 59 HIST. & THEORY 168, 180 (2020) (explaining the
reluctance of society to immediately accept Copernicus’s theory).
112. See Georg Northoff, Lessons from Astronomy and Biology for the Mind—Copernican
Revolution in Neuroscience, 13 FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 2 (2019).
113. See id. at 3.
114. See Siskin, supra note 111, at 180.
115. See Carl Sagan, The Solar System, 233 SCI. AM. 22, 23 (1975) (explaining Tychonic
system).
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scientific advances do not sweep all before them, and these advances
do not occur in a vacuum; instead, their influence—for good or ill—is
shaped and often controlled by the powerful force of cultural
institutions.116 Neuroscience is no exception. Copernicus did not
change the Aristotelian and Christian culture; instead, changes in
that culture made possible the positive acceptance and influence of
Copernicanism.117 Likewise, neuroscience will not change our culture; instead, we must carefully consider how our culture must
change to make it safe for neuroscience.
B. Individualism & Moral Responsibility
Changing the dangerous and destructive American retributivist
system of justice requires overcoming two closely connected and
deeply embedded elements of American culture: extreme individualism and commitment to individual moral responsibility. Profound
commitment to individual moral responsibility and just deserts is a
central feature of the American justice system, as well as a deep assumption in American culture.118 Because the culture and the justice
system are mutually supportive, the challenge is even greater.
Radical changes in American culture and in the American
criminal justice system are not impossible. Few Americans living
through the civil rights movement could have imagined recent cultural developments such as the election of the first Black president,
the City of Richmond taking down the statues of Robert E. Lee and
Jefferson Davis,119 and the mayor of Columbus, Ohio, announcing
the removal of an enormous statue of Christopher Columbus.120 My
skepticism concerns not the possibility of that change, but the possibility of advances in neuroscientific knowledge bringing about that
116. See Siskin, supra note 111, at 180.
117. See id.
118. See WALLER, supra note 87, at 67-68.
119. Gregory S. Schneider, Confederate Memorials Quietly Removed from Virginia Capitol
Overnight, WASH. POST (July 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-poli
tics/confederate-memorials-quietly-removed-from-virginia-capitol-overnight/2020/07/24/
8d2a0dee-cced-11ea-bc6a-6841b28d9093_story.html [https://perma.cc/JE2H-4PSD].
120. Bill Chappell, Columbus, Ohio, Takes Down Statue of Christopher Columbus, NPR
(July 1, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/
2020/07/01/885909530/columbus-ohio-takes-down-statue-of-christopher-columbus
[https://perma.cc/TKV2-XQTY].
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change. We are concerned here with changes in American beliefs,
and Americans rarely embrace scientific changes with open arms
and open minds. Most Americans reject the central elements of
Darwinism.121 Greene and Cohen envision a remarkable set of
devices that could demonstrate conclusively the nonexistence of the
traditional powers of free will that support belief in moral responsibility and just deserts:
At some time in the future we may have extremely highresolution scanners that can simultaneously track the neural
activity and connectivity of every neuron in a human brain,
along with computers and software that can [analyze] and
organize these data. Imagine, for example, watching a film of
your brain choosing between soup and salad. The analysis
software highlights the neurons pushing for soup in red and the
neurons pushing for salad in blue. You zoom in and slow down
the film, allowing yourself to trace the cause-and-effect relationships between individual neurons—the mind’s clockwork
revealed in arbitrary detail. You find the tipping-point moment
at which the blue neurons in your prefrontal cortex out-fire the
red neurons, seizing control of your pre-motor cortex and causing
you to say, “I will have the salad, please.”122

This is the stuff of science fiction, but even if such analysis machines existed, the general public would not be swayed by such a
demonstration; and libertarian philosophers—who defend a traditional account of free will involving special nondetermined first
cause choices—would not be convinced. “We never doubted,” they
would say, “that choices between soup and salad are fully determined. But the special choices of free will are not so mundane; they
are the choices between principle and desire, the choice to exert a
special power of will and rise to duty, the special ‘self-making’
choices that ultimately define our moral characters.”123 When
121. David Masci, For Darwin Day, 6 Facts About the Evolution Debate, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/11/darwin-day/ [https://perma.
cc/9UM4-JHD9] (finding that 18 percent of Americans believe evolution never occurs, 48 percent believe that evolution was guided by God, and 33 percent believe that evolution occurred
through natural processes).
122. Greene & Cohen, supra note 14, at 1781.
123. This hypothetical quote paraphrases other philosophers. See CHARLES A. CAMPBELL,
ON SELFHOOD AND GODHOOD 168 (1957) (“Here, and here alone ... in the act of deciding
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Benjamin Libet’s own experiments challenged the traditional view
of free will based on special conscious choices, Libet did not give
up free will; instead, he suggested the possibility of a “free won’t,”
postulating—with no evidence whatsoever—a special intervening
choice that could exercise veto power and preserve a workable notion of traditional free will.124 Perhaps neuroscience research will
have a power that sweeps all doubts before it, but that will make it
a uniquely powerful science, unlike any scientific advance that has
gone before.
Cultural change is difficult, and changing the judicial system
poses special challenges. The law can preserve its system against
almost any challenge from empirical evidence.125 Psychologists and
neuroscientists have made it clear that the legal image of humans
and human behavior is fundamentally different from that manifested by scientific research.126 The research has had some effect:
the United States has finally stopped executing juveniles.127 But it
has not altered the deep assumptions operating in criminal law.
Joshua Buckholtz and David Faigman argue persuasively for the
legal value of rigorous neuroscientific research “that can help guide
decisions about whether, how, and when cognitive and neuroscientific data can be used to make legal judgments about individual
defendants.”128 They affirm their belief “that neuroscience can and
should be used to enhance the fairness and efficiency of the legal

whether to put forth or withhold the moral effort required to resist temptation and rise to
duty, is to be found an act which is free in the sense required for moral responsibility; an act
of which the self is sole author.”); Robert Kane, Libertarianism, in FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL
26 (2007) (“I believe these undetermined self-forming actions ... occur at those difficult times
of life when we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or become.”).
124. Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of
Cerebral Activities (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act,
106 BRAIN 623, 641 (1983) (“There could be a conscious ‘veto’ that aborts the performance even
of the type of ‘spontaneous’ self-initiated act under study here.”).
125. See Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism out of the Criminal
Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 3-5, 14, 17, 35-36 (2005) (developing a detailed account of systematic judicial efforts to preserve the assumption of free will and moral responsibility from
any empirical challenges).
126. See CRAIG HANEY, CRIMINALITY IN CONTEXT: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 15-38 (2020).
127. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 575 (2005).
128. Buckholtz & Faigman, supra note 13, at R866.
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system.”129 But they insist that if neuroscience is to be valuable to
the law, neuroscience must be kept securely in its place:
However, the promise of neuroscience with respect to the law
can only ever be fulfilled if we clearly identify and resolve the
significant inferential issues that lie at the intersection of these
two disciplines.... Crucially, this effort should identify specific
legal concepts and standards that are either incommensurable
with neuroscience, or for which the law indicates that neuroscientific evidence is unnecessary or unwanted. The law is not
compelled to use neuroscientific evidence to render its decisions;
judgments made on the basis of moral intuition, normative preference, or institutional precedent do not require the consult of
neuroscientist[s].130

If neuroscience challenges the basic moral responsibility assumptions of the criminal law, at that point the law and neuroscience are
“incommensurable,” and that challenge is disallowed.131 “[J]udgments made on the basis of moral intuition, normative preference,
or institutional precedent”—including, of course, the basic intuition
of moral responsibility and free will—are locked in a secure place
where moth and rust cannot corrupt nor neuroscientists threaten.132
Herbert L. Packer makes explicit the fixed status of the deep and
indubitable assumption of free will and moral responsibility that is
commonly embraced in legal thought:
The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement of fact, but rather a value preference having
very little to do with the metaphysics of determinism and free
will.... [T]he law treats man’s conduct as autonomous and willed,
not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it
were.133

Chief Justice Burger (while serving on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) forcefully rejected any
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at R866-67.
See id.
Id. at R867.
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968).
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empirical challenge to the judicial standard for responsibility:
“Fixing standards of criminal responsibility is a legal not a medical
problem and if we adopt a test based, as it should be, on legal concepts which grow from our traditional ethical and moral standards,
we need not be concerned about reconciling the two.”134
Belief in a special “first cause” free will is a common belief in the
criminal justice system, stretching back hundreds of years and
continuing to the present. In 1765, William Blackstone stated that
“punishments are ... only inflicted for the abuse of that free-will,
which God has given to man.”135 At the dawn of the twentieth
century, attorney and journalist Gino Speranza affirmed a special
power of free will, combining it with a radical distinction between
the mind and the physical body:
Law ... stands, pre-eminently for the freedom of the will.
Without this as a foundation-stone juridic science has no
existence, for the very test of juridic responsibility is man’s
power of choice. To this the juridic philosopher brings the
sentiment of humanity, the teachings of metaphysics and the
experience of history, which are repugnant to the physical
measurement of the soul; he contends that after you have taken
man’s brain to pieces you have not yet found his mind; that
molecular interaction may be demonstrated as the physical
counterpart of thought, but it is not thought.136

Justice Cardozo agreed, stating that “the law has been guided by a
robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a
working hypothesis in the solution of its problems.”137 In Morissette
v. United States, the Court insisted that “belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil” is a basic and universal
element of the criminal law.138 In United States v. Grayson, the
Court ruled that a determinist view is “inconsistent with the

134. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring).
135. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27.
136. Gino C. Speranza, The Medico-Legal Conflict over Mental Responsibility, 13 GREEN
BAG 123, 125 (1901).
137. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
138. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
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underlying precepts of our criminal justice system.”139 Justice Scalia
was a stalwart judicial champion of individual moral responsibility,
and, in an article for a religious publication, he promoted precisely
the same view that Blackstone had championed more than two
centuries earlier:
The doctrine of free will—the ability of man to resist temptations to evil, which God will not permit beyond man’s capacity to
resist—is central to the Christian doctrine of salvation and
damnation, heaven and hell. The post-Freudian secularist, on
the other hand, is more inclined to think that people are what
their history and circumstances have made them, and there is
little sense in assigning blame.140

There is little doubt which perspective Scalia championed in his
years on the Supreme Court. The basic assumption of individual—
essentially miraculous—free will and moral responsibility also was
celebrated by Sanford Kadish, former Dean of the University of
California Law School:
While events in the physical world are governed by laws of nature that imply the existence of necessary and sufficient conditions, voluntary decisions to act are not. They are controlled by
the choice of the actor, a “wild card,” for whose action no set of
conditions is sufficient and no condition is necessary, save the
condition of a free act of will. Therefore, though it may be in any
particular case that the principal would not have chosen to act
without the influence of the accomplice, it is never so as a matter
of necessity, since the principal could have chosen otherwise.141

Treated as a central given element of the justice system, no empirical evidence—psychological, biological, or neuropsychological—
can threaten moral responsibility.142 On this view, neuroscience can
change some details concerning who is morally responsible and to
what degree, but it can never threaten the basic belief in moral
139.
140.
141.
(1987).
142.

438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978).
Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, 123 FIRST THINGS 17, 19 (2002).
SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 198
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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responsibility. In the law, moral responsibility is not an empirical
question but a given principle that defines the system. So long as
that principle is treated as indubitable—all the evidence of the
sciences143 notwithstanding—the needed changes will not occur.
C. The American Frontier
Moral responsibility is not unique to American criminal justice,
but the strength, centrality, and endurance of that commitment is
particularly powerful in the United States. Moral responsibility is
closely linked with the deep and distinctive rugged individualism at
the heart of American culture.144 As Craig Haney notes:
Psychological individualism was the prevailing explanatory
paradigm of [the nineteenth century] and its assumptions
permeated American law and society.... In recent years, the
nineteenth-century model of behavior has again been embraced
by a number of social scientists whose work has been widely
popularized by the media and used by criminal justice professionals to justify harsh policies of punitive segregation.145

The “rugged individual” is not just a popular icon of Western
movies, but a central theme in American culture: the self-sufficient
individual who stands alone and needs no help from anyone, who
“makes it on his own,” who “takes full responsibility” for his life and
actions.146 There are some “rugged individual” women—Ayn Rand

143. That evidence is set out very clearly by Paul Sheldon Davies. Paul Sheldon Davies,
Skepticism Concerning Human Agency: Sciences of the Self Versus “Voluntariness” in the Law,
in NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 113, 113-14, 122, 129-30 (Nicole A. Vincent ed.,
2013); see also Paul Sheldon Davies, Foundational Facts for Legal Responsibility: Human
Agency and the Aims of Restorative Neurointerventions, in NEUROINTERVENTIONS AND THE
LAW 322 (Nicole A. Vincent et al. eds., 2020).
144. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 142, 146 (1985).
145. Craig Haney, Criminal Justice and the Nineteenth-Century Paradigm: The Triumph
of Psychological Individualism in the “Formative Era,” 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 191, 192-93
(1982).
146. See Patrick James McQuillan, Culture in Conflict: Rugged Individualism and Educational Opportunity in a Diverse Society, in PROBLEMS AND ISSUES OF DIVERSITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 161 (Larry L. Naylor ed., 1999).
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and Margaret Thatcher are notorious examples—but the icon is
John Wayne, and the theme is typically tied to a hypermasculinity.147 Why did American culture embrace such extreme individualism?
Historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis”—the idea
that American culture was profoundly and uniquely shaped by its
open frontier and the opportunities it offered to adventurers, homesteaders, and pioneers—was a powerful influence on American historical thought, especially in the first half of the twentieth century,
and it remains a popular idea.148 Contemporary historians have
challenged several elements of Turner’s frontier thesis, but a recent
study established the enduring influence of the frontier on American
culture.149 The researchers do not endorse Turner’s overall work,
noting that his writings “paint an idealized portrait of frontiersman
and leave women and minorities out of the picture” and repeatedly
describe settlers taking “free land” that was more often the result
of conquest.150 But their empirical studies, inspired by Turner’s
frontier thesis, have revealed an important frontier contribution to
American rugged individualism:
The frontier fostered the development of distinctive cultural
traits, including individualism and opposition to government
intervention. The combination of these two traits characterizes
“rugged individualism”.... Frontier individualism is partly but
not entirely explained by selective migration. Frontier conditions
favored individualism through higher socioeconomic returns,
and they created expectations of high income growth through
effort, which fueled opposition to government intervention.... In
our conceptual framework, the significance of the frontier can be
explained by three factors. First, frontier locations attracted
individualists able to thrive in harsh conditions. Second, frontier
conditions—isolation and low population density—further cultivated self-reliance, and they offered favorable prospects for
147. See id. at 166-67.
148. See Frederick J. Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, ANN.
REP. AM. HIST. ASS’N FOR THE YEAR 1893, 199, 215-23 (1893).
149. See Samuel Bazzi et al., Frontier Culture: The Roots and Persistence of “Rugged Individualism” in the United States 1-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23997,
2020).
150. See id. at 4.
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upward mobility through effort, nurturing hostility to redistribution. Finally, frontier conditions shaped local culture at a critical
juncture, thus generating persistent effects.151

European settlers who risked the journey to North America were
already moving from settled country to a frontier, and their descendants who sought the risks and rewards farther west were powerfully drawn to the frontier life.152
The most striking result from their research is the strong link
between counties that had long periods of, what they call, “total
frontier experience” between 1790 and 1890 and the enduring contemporary attitude toward rugged individualism in those counties.153 Counties that remained frontier for longer periods—counties
in which, by measures of population density, the frontier endured
rather than moving farther west, counties that for various reasons
remained basically frontier rather than becoming settled—continue
to this day to have stronger cultures of rugged individualism. They
tend to support such conservative policies as preference for limited
government and low tax levels while opposing regulation (including
setting minimum wage levels) and the redistribution of wealth
(including welfare programs).154 When possible confounding variables were considered, the frontier influence remained.155 Though
the impact is stronger in some areas than others because of the
enduring frontier in those areas, the authors conclude that “over the
process of westward expansion, the frontier imbued a culture of
rugged individualism throughout the U.S.”156 The effects of sustained frontier culture remain strong, even under very different
conditions. The researchers note:
[F]rontier culture ... may have persisted through several
mechanisms, even after frontier conditions were long gone.
Cultural traits established at early stages can maintain and
151. Samuel Bazzi et al., Frontier Culture: The Roots and Persistence of “Rugged Individualism” in the United States 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23997,
2018).
152. See Bazzi et al., supra note 149, at 4.
153. See id. at 9-11.
154. See id. at 11-12.
155. See id. at 10.
156. Bazzi et al., supra note 151, at 4.
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even increase their prevalence through various forms of intergenerational transmission. As frontier experience started by
definition at the earliest stages of settlement, it was bound to
influence the formation of local institutions and social identity,
which likely affected subsequent cultural evolution.157

D. The Neoliberal Obstacle
Because individualism is deeply embedded in American culture
and radical individualism is a central element of neoliberalism, it is
not surprising that neoliberalism found a comfortable home in U.S.
economic and social thought.158 Michael Cavadino and James
Dignan make clear the connection between neoliberalism and individualism, as well as neoliberalism’s influence on the justice system:
The neo-liberal society tends to exclude both those who fail in
the economic marketplace and those who fail to abide by the
law—in the latter case by means of imprisonment, or even more
radically by execution. This is no coincidence. Both types of
exclusion are associated with a highly individualistic social
ethos. This individualistic ethos leads a society to adopt a neoliberal economy in the first place, but conversely the existence
of such an economy in return fosters the social belief that
individuals are solely responsible for looking after themselves.
In neo-liberal society, economic failure is seen as being the fault
of the atomized, free-willed individual, not any responsibility of
society—hence the minimal, safety-net welfare state. Crime is
likewise seen as entirely the responsibility of the offending
individual. The social soil is fertile ground for a harsh ‘law and
order ideology.’159

157. Id. at 3. A study of the frontier settlement of Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido
found that a “frontier culture” of individuality similar to that of the United States developed
and persisted. Shinobu Kitayama et al., Voluntary Settlement and the Spirit of Independence:
Evidence from Japan’s “Northern Frontier,” 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 369, 374 (2006)
(“Like European Americans in the United States, Hokkaido Japanese embody the spirit of
independent agency. These individuals put relatively equal weights on both personal achievement and social harmony. This is in sharp contrast with Japanese in mainland Japan.”).
158. See Michael Cavadino & James Dignan, Penal Policy and Political Economy, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 435, 448 (2006).
159. Id.
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Ronald Reagan expressed the hardline law and order individualism
that characterizes neoliberalism: “Our forebears were never concerned about why a person misbehaves. We are straying from the
principle of holding the individual responsible for his actions.”160 A
history of abuse, malnutrition, or even lead poisoning is irrelevant.161 John Major, the Conservative Prime Minister when neoliberalism had taken power in the United Kingdom, expressed it
clearly in a speech to the 1992 Conservative Party Conference:
“Crime wrecks lives, spreads fear, corrupts society. It is the fault of
the individual, and no one else.”162 Seeking to understand the larger
causes takes the narrow focus away from the individual, who bears
total responsibility.
What effect will neuroscientific advances have on the pernicious
radical individualism that permeates American culture and—as
Cavadino and Dignan note—provides “fertile ground” for its “law
and order ideology”?163 The prospects do not appear positive.
Suppose we reach the point that strong criminogenic factors can be
identified in the brains of those who have committed crimes, factors
much more precise and predictively reliable than any analysis we
can currently carry out and combinations of factors in precisely
identified brain areas. In the current neoliberal culture, these
advances would more likely exacerbate rather than ameliorate law
and order individualism. Focusing on the individual brain may
reinforce the belief that the fault lies not “in our stars” nor in our
environments, but in individual selves as manifested in individual
brains; the source of the criminal choice and behavior is clearly
identified in that individual’s brain—not in society or circumstances
or environment, but in that specific individual. Lock up the
offending individual and the danger is averted—the problem solved.
It may be even worse. If we ever reach such specific knowledge of
criminal brains, that knowledge will almost certainly precede by
many years any knowledge of how to fix such problems. The
160. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 66 (1997).
161. See John Major, U.K. Prime Minister, Leader’s Speech, BRITISH POLITICAL SPEECH
(1992), http://britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=138 [https://perma.cc/QP
4V-LP2V].
162. Id.
163. See Cavadino & Dignan, supra note 158, at 448.
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“nothing works” movement in criminology—the insistence that
“nothing works” in reforming criminal behavior164—devastated
promising programs165 for successful criminal rehabilitation and
encouraged massive long-term imprisonment as the only solution.166
If neuroscience seems to specify criminal brain structure with little
immediate hope of how to fix the problems, the result could be
“nothing works” on steroids. And the specter of “violent criminal
brains” that seem strange and alien may heighten fears rather than
enhance sympathetic understanding. The “only options” may seem
to be permanent incarceration or radical and dangerous brain
treatments. If we imagine that risky procedures that could cause
severe mental damage would not be adopted, we should remember
that in the United States at this moment there are thousands of
prisoners in solitary confinement who are suffering psychological
damage, much of which is irreversible.167 The knowledge of the
severe risk and the verifiable damage of such methods has not
eliminated their use.168 Any culture willing to swallow the camel of
long-term solitary confinement is not likely to strain at the gnat of
dubious and dangerous brain treatments. Joel Feinberg notes a
distressing tendency in the neoliberal United States—a trend
toward demanding severe punishment for those judged insane:
“Instead of being a kind of softening excuse, mental illness has
become in some quarters a kind of hardening aggravation. Instead
of saying, ‘He is mentally disordered, poor fellow, go easy on him,’
some now say, ‘He is a damned sicko, so draw and quarter him.’”169
As evidence of that disturbing trend, consider the response after
John Hinckley, Jr. was declared not guilty by reason of insanity.
Rather than taking the opportunity to better understand the
164. See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. 22, 48-50 (1974).
165. See Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Revivification of Rehabilitation: Evidence from
the 1980s, 4 JUST. Q. 349, 350 (1987) (“Our reviews of the research literature demonstrated
that successful rehabilitation of offenders had been accomplished, and continued to be accomplished quite well.”).
166. See Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 1975-2025 299, 329 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013).
167. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
169. JOEL FEINBERG, PROBLEMS AT THE ROOTS OF LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY 141 (2003).
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complex causes of antisocial behavior and the tragedy of severe
mental illness, there was a nationwide frenzy to restrict eligibility
for being found not guilty by reason of insanity170—notwithstanding
the fact that the defense is rare, and its success extremely rare.171
While some states abolished the insanity defense altogether,172
others adopted a particularly harsh, cruel, and nonsensical approach: the notorious “guilty but mentally ill” verdict.173 Defendants
found to be so psychologically impaired that they cannot meet the
standards for being guilty of a crime are found guilty anyway.174
They are then locked in a mental facility for the criminally insane.175
If following treatment they are finally declared sane, at that point
they begin serving a criminal sentence for their crime—the crime of
which they were not guilty by reason of insanity, though still found
“guilty” by the perverse “guilty but insane” verdict, which jurors

170. See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY
DEFENSE REFORM 2 (1993) (“Nearly all of the proposed reforms were designed to restrict use
of the insanity defense or to make it a less-attractive option for defendants.”).
171. See Carmen Cirincione et al., Rates of Insanity Acquittals and the Factors Associated
with Successful Insanity Pleas, 23 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 399, 408 (1995) (noting
that the defense is used in about 1 percent of felony cases and is successful in about a quarter
of those cases).
172. See, e.g., Brian E. Elkins, Idaho’s Repeal of the Insanity Defense: What Are We Trying
to Prove?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 151, 154-55 (1994).
173. See Linda C. Fentiman, “Guilty But Mentally Ill”: The Real Verdict Is Guilty, 26 B.C.
L. REV. 601, 604 (1985) (describing how the law is “fatally flawed in two fundamental respects”); Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time
Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 497 (1985) (arguing that the law “introduces a foreign and meaningless element into the criminal justice system”).
174. Caton F. Roberts et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: Decision Making
and the Insanity Defense, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 207, 222 (1987) (describing the study in
which 95 percent of subjects found a delusional paranoid schizophrenic not guilty by reason
of insanity when the only options were guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity; when the
guilty but mentally ill option was added, only 18 percent found the defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity while 77 percent opted for guilty but mentally ill). Another study found in
the absence of the guilty but mentally ill verdict, 60 percent of subjects favored the not guilty
by reason of insanity verdict; when the guilty but mentally ill option was added, only 35
percent favored not guilty by reason of insanity. Caton F. Roberts & Stephen L. Golding, The
Social Construction of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 349, 367
(1991). Similar results were found in another study. Jeffrey C. Savitsky & William D.
Lindblom, The Impact of the Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict on Juror Decisions: An Empirical
Analysis, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 686, 694 (1986) (adding a guilty but mentally ill option
reduced subjects’ verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity from 29 percent to 10 percent).
175. See Fentiman, supra note 173, at 624-28, 624 n.136.
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view as a reasonable “compromise.”176 The subsequent criminal
sentence is aimed exclusively at harsh retributive punishment,
since successful rehabilitation has already occurred.
The sincere hopes of Greene and Cohen notwithstanding, neuroscience is not the right tool for changing the culture of neoliberalism and its radical individualism, harsh retributivism, and
deep belief in individual “just deserts” and moral responsibility. The
key to undermining belief in individual moral responsibility is a
better understanding of the deeper causes of behavior and understanding the rich variety of factors—factors we neither chose nor
controlled—that went into shaping our current behavior. Focusing
on neuroscience may narrow the focus to the individual and to brain
disorders that few will understand and that are far from obvious. If
all who suffered brain damage had an iron spike protruding from
their skulls—like the famous Phineas Gage177—then destructive
brain damage would be easier to recognize. But problems in the
brain are not widely understood and are more likely to conjure up
unsympathetic images of dangerous and mysterious monsters than
of anything with which most people can easily identify and empathize. Because substantial elements of mind/brain dualism linger in
our culture, there is a sense that brains are permanent and intractable, while mind-driven behavior is flexible.178 Tracing causes of
behavior seems natural (though we often get them wrong, even for
our own behavior, and the inquiries are typically shallow); recognizing brain effects is much more difficult and does not come naturally.
CONCLUSION
The initial steps in loosening the grip of moral responsibility on
the American culture will not be by means of a more precise understanding of how the brain functions and malfunctions. That
understanding is in its early stages, and even when it is further
developed, it will be long before it becomes part of how most people
understand behavior and character. The more promising path to
176. See id. at 630, 636-37.
177. See JOHN FLEISCHMAN, PHINEAS GAGE: A GRUESOME BUT TRUE STORY ABOUT BRAIN
SCIENCE 5-7 (2002).
178. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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challenging moral responsibility is through confronting the harsh
reality of why some prosper while others suffer, including the gross
unfairness of the neoliberal system and its ugly “justification” by
means of moral responsibility and just deserts. The enormous
inequities in wealth generated by the neoliberal system, the grossly
inadequate “safety net” for those harmed by the system, the exposure of the poor to environmental toxins in their substandard
housing and water supply, the rank injustice of the “justice system”
in which the poor are locked up when they cannot afford bail while
the wealthy, with their lawyers and connections, avoid criminal
prosecution—these problems are more obvious and accessible and
a more promising path to reform. Black Lives Matter forced Americans to confront the glaring racism and injustice in the American
justice system, from the racist practices of many police forces to the
long practice of failing to prosecute or convict police officers and
prison guards guilty of brutal assaults, horrific homicides, and perjured testimony. The visceral angry reactions of many to Black
Lives Matter shows that we have a long way to go, but shining a
bright light on systemic injustice is a good start.
When we confront the enormous differences in the starting points
of the poor and the wealthy—substandard schools versus private
prep schools, malnutrition versus excellent nutrition, limited or
nonexistent health and dental care versus specialists and orthodontists, constant harassment by the police versus special protection
and dismissed charges, the debilitating effects of prejudice versus
the special privileges of “legacy admission”179 to the best universities—then it is difficult to swallow the neoliberal myth that the
wealthy and the impoverished or imprisoned are receiving their just
deserts for their morally responsible choices and behavior.
Breaking down the neoliberal system of self-made individuals,
moral responsibility, and retributive punishment is best accomplished by deep examination of the causal factors that shape both
success and failure in our society, and by the recognition that, for all
of us, our successful or failed outcomes are fundamentally a matter
of luck. The criminal is not an alien monster, but someone a lot like
179. The Editorial Board, End Legacy College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/07/opinion/sunday/end-legacy-college-admissions.html
[https://perma.cc/Z4B9-GHQ9].
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me—had I taken the same path from the same starting point, I
might also be living in prison rather than affluent comfort. Empathy can begin to replace fear and loathing. Looking harder and
deeper at causes—and at our radically different starting points and
paths—exposes the nonsense of the “self-made man” and his moral
responsibility and just deserts.180 Rugged self-made individuals
obviously have free will; they are first causes, and their histories do
not matter. The absurdity of such self-making does not prevent it
from being a cornerstone belief. When we root out the individualism
and self-making and recognize the importance of social cooperation
and what others have done for us and to us, for good or ill, then we
can start to make the necessary changes in our culture. When the
focus is on the current state of the individual brain, the causes of
how that brain developed remain hidden.
This is not to suggest that advances in neuroscience cannot have
an impact on belief in moral responsibility. The fervent hope is that
eventually improved understanding of the neurological factors that
cause antisocial behavior will make people less likely to condemn
and more likely to deal more effectively and less cruelly with those
who commit crimes. There is some basis for that hope. Extensive
research shows that greater understanding of causes reduces the
desire to blame and reduces the fear that motivates harsh criminal
policies.181 We fear what we do not understand and particularly condemn anyone who seems profoundly different from ourselves. When
we recognize that the person who committed a disturbing crime is
much like ourselves, with a brain very similar to our own except for
a specific problem that was not the work of the criminal and is
something that could happen to any of us—including our children
and loved ones—then the fear may be replaced by sympathy.
Someone who was brutalized by abuse and trauma is someone we
180. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24-25, 37-38 (1979); BRUCE N.
WALLER, AGAINST MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 115-31 (2011); NEIL LEVY, HARD LUCK: HOW LUCK
UNDERMINES FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 87-106 (2011); ADRIAN RAINE, THE
ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CRIME 242-72 (2013); JONATHAN WOLFF
& AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 119-28 (2007); Gregg D. Caruso, A Defense of the Luck
Pincer: Why Luck (Still) Undermines Moral Responsibility, 28 J. INFO. ETHICS 51 (2019).
181. See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126
PSYCH. BULL. 556 (2000); David Indermaur et al., A Matter of Judgment: The Effect of Information and Deliberation on Public Attitudes to Punishment, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 147
(2012).
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can understand, and someone we ourselves might have been. That
individual may still be dangerous, but he is a lot like me and must
be treated with decency and respect, and every effort must be made
to help him.
Individualist moral responsibility is a destructive and dangerous
force that blocks deeper understanding, supports harsh retributive
punishment, glorifies greed as just deserts, and minimizes resources
for the less fortunate. There is no magic bullet for fixing the profound wrongs in American culture, but recognizing the nature of the
neoliberal system and its harmful elements is the vital first step.
Neuroscience may not strike the first blows, but eventually it can
lead to significant improvements in the way our criminal justice
system operates and contribute to a major restructuring of our
culture and our system of criminal justice. In ten years, my hope is
not that neuroscience will have transformed our society and our
criminal justice system; instead, I hope that our culture will have
changed in ways that make it safe for the effective and beneficial
use of neuroscience.

